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I. Introduction
In 1986 the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi. 1
The Court held that federal law preempted a Mississippi Oil and Gas Board
order which would have required Transco, an interstate pipeline, to take gas
ratably 2 from all producers in the Harper Sand, a common source of supply
in southern Mississippi, regardless of whether Transcontinental had contracts
with these producers. The decision continues to have a strong impact on the
natural gas industry. The states have a substantial interest in protecting the cor-
1. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
2. "Ratably" means in proportion to all the owners' interests in the gas well. 474 U.S. at 409.
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relative rights of co-owners in a common source of supply from waste and
drainage. Yet, the Transcontinental decision foreclosed the states from regulating
gas purchasing, even though several categories of natural gas were deregulated
through the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and presumably removed from fed-
eral control.
This note will examine the Transcontinental decision and its impact on state
regulation of the natural gas industry. The federal regulatory schemes that have
existed in the United States since the 1930's will be analyzed in turn. The goals
and policies underlying these regulatory arrangements will also be discussed,
and decisions thereunder will be scrutinized for congruency with these federal
policies.
Finally, a survey of the states' alternatives in the wake of Transcontinental
will be undertaken. All regulatory alternatives for the states necessarily lie in
the area of production regulation. The states have strong interest in safeguard-
ing correlative rights of co-owners in a common source of supply, and it seems
the Transcontinental decision has indeed left them in an unfavorable position.
HI. FACT SUMMARY
Getty Oil Company (Getty) and Coastal Exploration (Coastal) held produc-
tion shares 3 in several natural gas wells producing out of a common poolI known
as the Harper Sand. I The Harper Sand gas pool underlies portions of two adja-
cent fields6 in southern Mississippi. 7 In 1982 there were at least six wells produc-
ing out of the Harper Sand," which is at a depth of better than 15,000 feet. 9
While there were interest holders of diverse magnitudes in these wells, 10 Getty
held a large percentage of the production shares in the three wells involved. 11
3. A producer is one who owns "all or part interest in a well . . .capable of producing natural gas."
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 457 So. 2d 1298, 1305 n.1 (Miss. 1984).
See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-1-3(h) (1972). An operator is one who is authorized to take charge of the
development of a producing well. 457 So. 2d at 1305 n.2. Getty was both the operator and a producer in
several of the wells here involved. Coastal owned small undivided working interests in several of these wells.
Id. at 1308.
4. A pool is "an underground reservoir containing a common accumulation of oil or gas or both." 457
So. 2d at 1307 n.4. See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-1-3(e) (1972).
5. 457 So. 2d at 1307.
6. Id. A field is defined as "the general area which is underlaid by at least one pool; ...[including]
the underground . . . reservoirs containing oil or gas or both." Id. at n.3. See also Miss. CODE ANN. §
53-1-3(f) (Supp. 1987).
7. The fields, known as the Greens Creek Field and the East Morgantown Field, were separate natural
gas fields as defined by the State Oil and Gas Board in 1980. 457 So. 2d at 1307.
8. Id. Three of these wells were operated by Getty. The remaining three Harper Sand wells were oper-
ated by companies not parties to the Transcontinental case.
9. Id. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
10. 457 So. 2d at 1305.
11. Id. at 1308.
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In 1980 Getty entered into a long-term contract 12 with Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corporation (Transco), an interstate pipeline company, 13 for the pur-
chase of gas. 1
4
Until 1982, as was customary,'" Coastal, like other small interest owners,
had allowed Getty to arrange for the sale of its portion of the gas produced
to Transco, even though Coastal and Transco had no contract between them. 1
6
These sales were generally for the same price and on the same terms as the
contracts with Getty, the signatory seller. 17 However, in 1982, as a result of
an industry-wide glut, the price of and the demand for natural gas plummeted,
and Transco began invoking the "market-out"' provisions contained in some
of the company's contracts. "9 Transco also announced that it would no longer
purchase gas from those with whom it had no contract. 20 Coastal sought to ratify
Getty's contract, and Transco counter-offered with a contract containing a low-
er purchase price 2' than that in the Getty contracts in addition to a "market-out"
provision.22
Coastal refused this counter-offer and Transco ceased purchasing Coastal's
gas. 23 It should be noted, however, that fifty-five other small interest owners
accepted this offer from Transco . 21 Subsequently, Getty cut back production
12. As is typical in the natural gas industry, this contract contained a "take-or-pay" clause, which re-
quires the pipeline purchaser to take delivery on an allotted percentage of the gas well's production capabili-
ty or pay the contract price for the gas and postpone delivery until a later date. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi, 474 U.S. 409, 412 (1986). For a general discussion
of take-or-pay clauses, see Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV.
63, 77-79 (1982).
13. Transco had been contracting with producers in the East Morgantown anl Greens Creek Fields for
the purchase of natural gas since 1978. By 1982 Transco was committed to a total of thirty-five long-term
contracts in these two fields alone. 457 So. 2d at 1307-08.
14. The contract price for the gas was $7.907 per thousand cubic feet (mcf). Contract prices for gas
produced from the other Harper Sand wells ranged from $5.00 mcf to $9.054 mcf, depending upon market
conditions at the time the contracts were entered into. 457 So. 2d at 1308.
15. Id. at 1309. Getty, as the operator, had the right but not the obligation to sell Coastal's and the
other smaller owners' shares of the gas under the operating agreement. Id. at 1309 n.6. For a discussion
of the operator's duties and the co-owner's rights under the operating agreement, see Smith, Gas Marketing
by Co-owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors'Claims to Royalty, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
365 (1987).
16. 457 So. 2d at 1309.
17. Id. at 1308.
18. "Market-out" provisions allow the pipeline company to adjust the gas purchase price downward if
economic conditions become unfavorable. Id. at 1309.
19. Id. Transco began paying those sellers $5.00 mcf pursuant to the "market-out" provisions in the
contracts. But cf id. at 1323. (Justice Robertson's view that Transco would not have been in court had it
negotiated a "market-out" provision in its contract with Getty).
20. Id. at 1309.
21. The proposed purchase price was $5.00 mcf, the then-current market value of high-cost gas. Id. at 1310.
22. Id. at 1309. See supra note 18.
23. 457 So. 2d at 1309. Coastal was unable to find another purchaser for its gas, even though another
pipeline, Tennessee Gas Pipe Line Co., also serviced these wells. Id. at 1310-11.
24. Id. at 1309.
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of these wells to allow only an amount which would satisfy its own interests
to be produced. 25
At this point the phenomenon of drainage 26 should be interjected and explained.
It is a commonplace occurrence and one which has been the subject of con-
siderable litigation. 27 Under the principle of the Rule of Capture, the owner
of mineral rights that correspond to a tract of land that he owns has the right
to produce as much oil and gas as he can from a well on his property. The
Rule of Capture can sometimes provide an incentive for overproduction and
waste. 28 When more than one well produces out of a common source or pool,
the potential for production imbalances and drainage arises. The gas below the
ground is under pressure, and when it is extracted through drilling processes,
the pressure at the point of extraction is decreased. The migratory nature of
the hydrocarbon is such that the gas will then flow to the area of least pressure
or resistance. The cumulative effect deprives other wells producing from the
common pool of their share of the gas because their gas has migrated from their
property to that of another. 2 9 Another unpleasant side effect of the drainage
problem is that any gas remaining under the deprived owner's tract will some-
times be more difficult to extract because of this decrease in pressure. 30
Since there were at least six wells producing out of the Harper Sand, the im-
balance in production and gas sales stemming from the above-mentioned events
triggered drainage problems. The effect of Transco's refusal to purchase Coastal's
gas and of Getty's subsequent cutback of production was to deprive Coastal of
its share of the gas produced from the Harper Sand. In light of the recognized
drainage problem, this deprivation could be permanent. 31
Coastal sought relief from the State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi (Board). 3
One of the Board's duties is to create and enforce rules against abuse of the
correlative rights3 3 of each owner of oil and gas in a common source of sup-
ply. 34 Coastal filed a petition with the Board on July 29, 1982, requesting that
25. Id. at 1310.
26. Id. at 1306. See also Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474 U.S.
409,413 (1986). See generally Martin, The Establishment of Allowables for Production of Gas in Louisiana,
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 267, 267-69 (1986) (discussion of the phenomenon of drainage).
27. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Kan. 355, 358, 362 P.2d 599, 602 (1961)
(Kansas Supreme Court took judicial notice of drainage and its effects); Shell Oil Co. v. James, 257 So.
2d 488, 494-95 (Miss. 1971) (Mississippi Supreme Court defined drainage).
28. For a discussion of the Rule of Capture, see Martin, The Establishment of Allowables for Production
of Gas in Louisiana, 57 U. CoLO. L. REV. 267, 267-68 (1986).
29. 457 So. 2d at 1306-07.
30. Id. at 1310; Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd. 474 U.S. 409,413 (1986).
31. 457 So. 2d at 1310.
32. Id. at 1311. The Board is an administrative agency created by the State of Mississippi. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 53-1-5 (1972). See also 457 So. 2d at 1325-27.
33. Correlative rights protect every owner in a common source of supply of oil and gas by assuring
his fair chance to reap the economic benefits resulting from obtaining his just and equitable share of produc-
tion therefrom. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-1-1 (1972).
34. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-1-17(c)(13) (Supp. 1987).
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Transco be required to take gas "ratably"3 5 from all the owners within the com-
mon source pool, and to purchase without discrimination in favor of Getty against
Coastal. 36 Coastal was, in effect, endeavoring to persuade the Board to force
Transco to comply with Statewide Rule 48, a rule promulgated by the Board
in November, 1951. 37 Statewide Rule 48 was drafted to combat the inequities
produced by drainage and provides that a purchaser of oil or gas must "pur-
chase without discrimination in favor of one owner ... against another in the
same common source of supply."38
In mid-October of 1982, the Board ruled in favor of Coastal and issued Ord-
er No. 409-82, which required Transco to comply with Statewide Rule 48 and
to take and purchase 39 gas ratably from all owners in the Harper Sand pool,
if it chose to take any gas at all. 40
Transco appealed the Board's order to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial
District, Hinds County, Mississippi. 41 On June 28, 1983, the court affirmed
Order No. 409-82, and Transco subsequently took an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi. 
42
Before the supreme court, Transco contended that Mississippi's authority to
make and enforce Statewide Rule 48 was preempted by federal law, either by
virtue of the commerce clause,43 or through the supremacy clause"4 via the Natur-
al Gas Act45 (NGA) or the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). 4
The Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged that the state's authority to en-
force Statewide Rule 48 would have been preempted prior to the enactment of
the NGPA . 4 7 The court held that since the gas produced from the Harper Sand
pool was high-cost natural gas, 48 a category deregulated by the NGPA, 49 the
NGA, as modified by the NGPA, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion's (FERC) jurisdiction thereunder did not apply to the case before it. 50 The
35. See supra note 2.
36. 457 So. 2d at 1311.
37. Id. at 1311. Rule 48 had never before been employed to obtain relief for drainage loss as against
a purchaser of natural gas. Id. at 1306.
38. Statewide Rule 48, Mississippi Oil and Gas Board Rules (1952).
39. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
40. 457 So. 2d at 1311. (quoting Order No. 409-82, State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi, October
13, 1982).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1312.
43. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
45. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1982).
46. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982).
47. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 457 So. 2d 1298, 1314 (Miss. 1984).
See generally Arkansas Electric Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1983)
(federal decision to forego regulation may have as much preemptive force as decision to regulate); Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (fundamentals of federal preemption of state
regulations); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977) (same).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c)(1).
49. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (other categories of gas affected by the NGPA).
50. 457 So. 2d at 1316.
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court decided the preemption issue in favor of the Board and against Transco.51
Transco also advanced the theory that the enforcement of Order No. 409-82
was unconstitutional, "because it create[d] an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce." 52 The court rejected this contention, employing the balanc-
ing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. , a which involved a balancing
of the legitimate local public interest advanced by the challenged law, rule, etc.,
and the burden on interstate commerce . 5 4 The court held that the legitimate
local interests of conservation and protection of correlative rights advanced by
Statewide Rule 48 and Order No. 409-82 outweighed the incidental effect on
interstate commerce .
5 5
Transco had several other claims before the Mississippi Supreme Court.
Among these were a void-for-vagueness contention " and a taking without com-
pensation claim. 57 The court rejected these claims summarily,51 but reversed
the part of Order No. 409-82 which could possibly have been construed to re-
quire Transco to purchase without discrimination in price against one owner
in favor of another. " In the other respects, the judgment of the circuit court
was affirmed.
60
Transco finally appealed the Board's order No. 409-82 to the United States
Supreme Court. "[B]ecause of the importance of the issues in the functioning
of the interstate market in natural gas," 61 the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
62
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The decision in Transcontinental Pipe Line v. State Oil and Gas Bd. 63 (Tran-
scontinental) was influenced by the Natural Gas Act" (NGA) and the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 197865 (NGPA), as well as judicial decisions construing these
statutes. To evaluate the holding in Transcontinental, it is necessary to under-
stand the mechanisms of the natural gas industry, Congress' purpose in regulating
51. Id. at 1318.
52. Id.
53. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
54. Id. at 142.
55. 457 So. 2d at 1321-23.
56. Id. at 1323-24.
57. Id. at 1324-25.
58. Id. at 1323-25.
59. Id. at 1331. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Board had no authority to engage in
price regulation and that Rule 48 should be construed so as to prohibit discrimination with respect to quanti-
ty, not price. Id. at 1330. The court qualified this holding by requiring that a pipeline, in order to comply
with Rule 48, must offer in good faith, a reasonable price in keeping with prevailing market conditions.
Id. at 1331. Cf. note 19 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 1332.
61. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 411 (1986).
62. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 470 U.S. at 1083 (1985).
63. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1982).
65. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
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it, and the Court's interpretation of the Congressional mandates when controver-
sies have arisen.
A. The Natural Gas Act and its Dire Consequences
In 1938, President Roosevelt signed into law the Natural Gas Act, which had
been designed to give the federal government control over the interstate sales
and transportation of natural gas .6 6 The aim of the NGA was to deter the
monopolistic practices of interstate pipeline companies by suppressing the price
at which producers sold gas to them, 7 thus protecting the public as well as
the industry.68
The Federal Power Commission (FPC) was given the task of administering
the NGA. The FPC was to set reasonable cost-based price ceilings for the sale
of natural gas in the interstate market, I thus ensuring consumer protection among
the competing interests. These ceilings were to be determined by considering
the actual cost of the gas plus a reasonable rate of return with an allowance
for depreciation. 70
The FPC at first used an individual cost-of-service method in arriving at its
price ceilings. 71 Thus, each producer of gas was given individual attention in
the determination of its ceiling. This soon proved to be an impractical method,
and as the backlog of cases mounted into the thousands, the FPC searched for
a better way to fix price ceilings. 72
In 1960, the FPC began implementing area-rate methods in its determination
of price ceilings .7 3 The FPC divided the nation into five regions, and embarked
on extensive studies to deternine a reasonable ceiling for each area. 74 The studies
were so intensive and the conditions of the industry so dynamic that by the time
the ceilings were affixed, they had already become antiquated. 7 The result of
these obsolete ceilings was the gas shortage of the early 1970's, when the problem
was serious enough to warrant rationing. 6 However, it was during this period
66. Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 65 (1982).
67. Pierce, supra note 66 at 65. See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
406 U.S. 621 (1972); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Federal Power Comm'n
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
68. Breyer and MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers,
86 HARV. L. REV. 941, 941 (1973).
69. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1968).
70. Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 101, 107 (1980). See
also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756 (1968).
71. Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 101, 107 (1980).
72. 390 U.S. 747 at 756-58.
73. 390 U.S. at 758.
74. Pierce, supra note 66 at 67 n.16.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Id. at 67-68. The shortage was the result of the industry's failure to meet market demand and the
subsequent decline of gas reserves. The effects on the consumer ranged from lay-offs in gas-related indus-
tries to deaths caused by lack of heat. Id. at 67-68 n. 18. See also Breyer and MacAvoy, The Natural Gas
Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 941, 976-79 (1973).
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of area-rate regulation that the FPC first adopted a dual price system distin-
guishing between "old gas" and "new gas." The theory was that "old gas" or
gas flowing from existing wells, would have production costs that were cons-
tant, since the major expense of discovery and drilling had already been in-
curred.77 Therefore, gas from these wells would have lower price ceilings than
"new gas," which would come from wells not yet drilled. The purpose of this
system was also two-fold: to encourage the development of new wells and to
prevent sellers of "old gas" from incurring a windfall at the consumer's expense.
7
In response to the shortages, the FPC, in 1974, adopted a "national-rate"
approach in which it considered future cost projections when setting the price
ceilings for "new gas." 79 Consequently, the ceilings rose significantly, but the
shortages persisted.
By the late 1970's, it was apparent that there were many problems with the
NGA. Regulation under the NGA had caused natural gas shortages: supply was
low, yet demand was high. Since the intrastate market was free of regulation,
the prices were higher and much of the exploration and new drilling operations
were being directed there. "
B. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 - The Hands-Off Method
In response to these problems, Congress enacted the NGPA. In passing this,
Congress sought to protect consumers by ensuring a continuous supply of natural
gas as well as by keeping prices low.81 The NGPA increased the scope of fed-
eral regulation to include the sale of all natural gas, whether interstate or in-
trastate. 82 The purpose of this expansion of scope was to provide uniformity
in the industry, thus discouraging preference of one market over another. 83 In-
centive pricing was used to spur exploration in order to ensure supplies. 84 The
old price controls on existing gas were preserved to prevent an increase in con-
sumer prices. 85 The price ceiling system was changed from a double-tiered to
a multi-tiered one, but it retained the same purposes and objectives. 8 6 The three
main categories were:
1) High-cost natural gas or gas produced from great depths. 87 Briefly,
77. Pierce, supra note 66 at 67-68.
78. Id. at 68-69.
79. Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act, 59 TEX. L. REv. 101, 110 (1980).
80. Id. at 112.
81. Breyer and MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers,
86 HARV. L. REV. 941, 943 (1973).
82. Note, supra note 79, at 120-21.
83. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3315(b)(3)(A) & (D), 3316(b) (1982).
84. Note, supra note 79, at 112.
85. Note, supra note 79, at 116. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3313, 3317-3318, 3320 (1982) (the incentive
price sections).
86. Id.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c) (1982).
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the Harper Sand gas in Transcontinental fell within this category.
High-cost gas accounts for only a small portion (less than 10%) of
the total of gas sold, and in 1979, to encourage development and
exploration, this category of gas was deregulated.
2) New gas from new wells. " Under the NGPA, this category was
still subject to price ceilings and was to become deregulated in the
future.
3) Old gas from existing wells. 8 9 This type of natural gas would
continue to keep the same price ceilings as before, increasing only
at the rate of inflation. 9o
The scheme summarized above represents a gradual deregulation of the sales
of natural gas, with the ultimate goal being low consumer prices resulting from
a more balanced market.
Though the NGA proved too restrictive on the natural gas industry, the NGPA
did not represent a desire of Congress to completely abandon oversight of the
sales of natural gas. The lower court in Transcontinental, however, apparently
viewed the NGPA as such a Congressional abandonment.
C. Northern Natural - Preemption Under the NGA
In 1963, in the wake of the area-rate pricing confusion, the Supreme Court
decided Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n. 91 The issue before
the Court in that case was, for all practical purposes, identical to the controversy
in Transcontinental, that being whether the oil and gas administrative board
(The State Corporation Commission) could order an interstate pipeline company
(Northern Natural Gas Company) to purchase gas ratably from all owners in
a common source. 92 The Court invalidated this order, holding that it invaded
the jurisdiction vested in the FPC by the NGA. 
93
The Kansas Supreme Court had upheld the order, ruling that it was applica-
ble to the "production and gathering" of natural gas and therefore exempted
from the jurisdiction of the FPC by virtue of 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1)(b). 94 The
Court rejected this holding, stating that production and gathering were terms
narrowly to be defined to include the extraction of oil and gas from the earth
and the preparation for the first stages of distribution only. 95 Even if the order
was imposed as a conservation measure, the Court concluded that if it inter-
fered with the NGA's purpose of uniformity, whether directly or indirectly,
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3313 (1982).
89. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314-3316, 3318-3319 (1982).
90. Pierce, supra note 66, at 88-89.
91. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
92. Id. at 85-86.
93. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
94. 372 U.S. at 89.
95. Id. at 90.
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it could not stand. 96 The order would result in a readjustment of purchase pat-
terns and consequently would jeopardize the balance between cost structures
and consumer costs which was the very essence of the FPC's jurisdiction. 
97
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the state's regulatory authority must be subor-
dinated to that of the federal government. The order was thus struck down.
However, a state conservation measure was approved in Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 98 where the Court sustained a state order requir-
ing ratable production. The order had been made in the interests of conserva-
tion, and the Court stated that since it applied to production which was intrastate
in nature and not to the sale or transportation of hydrocarbons, it was not threaten-
ing to federal regulation, and could stand.99
In light of the foregoing statutes and cases, it is evident that Congress has
been concerned for a great part of this century with the task of ensuring ade-
quate supplies of natural gas to the consumers at a favorable price. The courts,
on the other hand, have been faced with the formidable duty of striking a balance
between the states' interests in conservation of its natural resources, the interests
of Congress in natural resources, and Congress' authority to regulate the natural
gas industry.
IV. THE TRANSCONTINENTAL OPINIONS
A. The Majority
In 1963, the Supreme Court had struck down a regulation similar to the Mis-
sissippi Board's order in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of
Kansas on federal preemption grounds.loo0 The Court remarked that an appli-
cation of the standard employed in Northern Natural would almost certainly
produce the same result in the case at bar. 10 The issue to be decided was whether
the enactment of the NGPA of 1978 12 varied the scheme of federal regulation
enough to produce a result different from that in Northern Natural. o3 The Court
stated that the rationale behind the decision in Northern Natural was the preser-
vation of Congress' role in regulating the natural gas industry, as well as the
ensurance of low prices, and consumer protection. 11 The Court discussed the
purposes behind the NGA of 1938, which were to give the FPC 105 the power
to regulate prices and to set price ceilings for gas sales from producers to pipe-
96. Id. at 91.
97. Id. at 92.
98. 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
99. Id. at 235.
100. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
101. 474 U.S. at 417.
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982).
103. 474 U.S. 409, 417 (1986).
104. Id. at 420.
105. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) is the predecessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC), which is the administrative authority of the NGPA.
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lines. 106 In the early 1970's, it became apparent that these measures were not
proving effective in combating the natural gas shortages and related problems,
and the NGPA of 1978107 was subsequently enacted in an attempt to rectify
the situation. 108 The NGPA, the Court stressed, represented a new role for Con-
gress, but did not signal a retreat from all jurisdiction over the sale of natural
gas. 109 Coastal argued that the NGPA divested the FERC of jurisdiction over
high-cost natural gas such as that produced out of the Harper Sand, thereby
leaving the states free to regulate it. "0 The Court agreed that the FERC could
no longer directly regulate the prices at which interstate pipelines purchased
natural gas falling in the high-cost category, but said that Mississippi's action
"directly undermine[d] Congress' determination that the supply, the demand,
and the price of high-cost gas be determined by market forces.""' The Court
further stated that a divestment of jurisdiction of the FERC by Congress was
not equivalent to a gift of that power to the states. 11 2 If this had been a goal
of Congress, a determination in that respect would have been made explicit-
ly. 1 3 The Court expressed displeasure with the Mississippi order for two other
reasons. First, because the Order would force interstate pipelines to comply
with varied state regulations, the uniformity of the federal scheme envisioned
by Congress would be disrupted. 1 4 Second, the Court found that the ratable-
take order would have as an ultimate effect increased prices to consumers. 
1 15
Because of these concerns and in the interest of federal preemption, the Court
reversed the Mississippi court's decision. "1 However, the Court declined to
reach a decision on the commerce clause question, since it had already reversed
on the above-enumerated grounds.
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist began by noting that "ratable-take" orders
are a common solution to the common problem of drainage in the oil and gas
industry.'" He stated that the Harper Sand gas is no longer covered by the
106. 474 U.S. at 420.
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982).
108. 474 U.S. at 420. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
109. 474 U.S. at 421. For a discussion of the FERC's functions and duties since the enactment of the
NGPA see Haase, The Federal Role in Implementing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 16 Hous. L. REv.
1067 (1979).
110. 474 U.S. at 421.
111. Id. at 422.
112. Id. at 423.
113. Id. at 422. The states are explicitly given regulatory authority with respect to natural gas produc-
tion, 15 U.S.C. § 3413(c), and the authority to establish ceiling prices, in 15 U.S.C. § 3432(a).
114. 474 U.S. at 423.
115. Id. For a general discussion, compare Williams, Federal Preemption of State Conservation Laws
After the Natural Gas Policy Act: A Preliminary Look, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 521, 532 (1985) (suggesting
that any problem of increased consumer costs would be attributable to Transco's imprudent purchasing practices).
116. 474 U.S. at 425.
117. Id. at 425-26.
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NGA, and that for this reason, Northern Natural"" should not govern the rul-
ing in this case. 119 Justice Rehnquist stated that the issue should have been whether
the ratable-take rule was a stumbling-block to the full accomplishment of the
NGPA's objectives, which were to eliminate governmental controls on the well-
head price of natural gas. 120 The dissent categorized the Board's order as a state
regulation which defines property rights or establishes contract rules,1 21 but
which does not interfere with interstate commerce. 122 Instead, the dissent ar-
gued that these regulations served to promote the efficient functioning of the
market. 123 Justice Rehnquist asserted that the ratable-take order would not affect
prices in the spot market or in long-term contract settings. 124 The dissent fur.
ther noted that Transco was in fact largely responsible for its own predicament,
since it was charged with awareness of all state regulations when it undertook
to conduct business in Mississippi. 1 25 The only reason the Board's order had
an adverse effect on Transco, the dissent concluded, was that Transco had en-
tered into long-term contracts with take-or-pay conditions. 
126
V. ANALYSIS
The majority in Transcontinental1 27 relied heavily on the reasoning in Northern
Natural. 128 This was true even though the two decisions occurred under differ-
ent congressional regulatory schemes: Northern Natural under the NGA, 129 and
Transcontinental under the NGA as modified by the NGPA. 130
A. The Collision of the Northern Natural Ratable-Take Order and
the Goals of the NGA
Congress enacted the NGA upon the determination that the natural gas in-
dustry was "affected with a public interest" in the distribution of natural gas
to the public. 131 In light of this determination, federal regulation of natural gas
sales and transportation was deemed "necessary in the public interest." 132 Per-
tinent cases have revealed a general consensus that the foremost goal of the
NGA was consumer protection from high prices imposed by an exploitative
118. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
119. 474 U.S. at 429.
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id. at 433-34.
122. Id. at 434.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 433.
125. Id. at 434-35.
126. Id. at 435. See supra note 12 for a definition of take-or-pay provisions.
127. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
128. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Corrun'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
129. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982).
130, Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1982).
132. Id.
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natural gas industry. 1 3Another concern reflected was the need to fill the regula-
tory "gap" resulting in the federal prohibition of state regulatory authority of
interstate commerce activities. 134
The court in Northern Natural, in deciding the preemption issue, recognized
that the federal regulatory scheme embodied in the NGA was comprehensive
and left no room for direct or indirect state regulation of natural gas prices. 135
Any state action upsetting the uniformity of regulation envisioned by the NGA
was therefore invalid. 136 The balancing of the production or output of gas wells
in the state was viewed as a task best left to that state's oil and gas commission,
rather than to the interstate purchaser upon whose shoulders the burden would
fall if ratable-take orders were upheld. 137 The Northern Natural Court also recog-
nized the traditional state power of conservation and allocation of its natural
resources; yet, the Court held that a state regulation which threatened to under-
mine the federal regulatory scheme could not stand, no matter the legitimacy
of the premise under which it was promulgated. 
1 3
Under the NGA, then, ratable-take orders were prohibited by Northern Natural
due to their indirect interference with the price of natural gas in the interstate
market. Although the denouncement of any state regulation which affects prices
seems overbroad, the decision in Northern Natural was congruent with the poli-
cies of consumer protection from exorbitant prices attributed to the NGA.
During the NGA's reign as the primary federal regulatory scheme in the natural
gas industry, federal interest in pricing matters was arguably more pervasive
than it is now under the NGPA. This is evidenced by the difference in the regula-
tory schemes, as well as by the degree of direct federal involvement in the in-
dustry. Under the NGA, price ceilings were determined by the FPC. This
required intensive involvement of the FPC at all levels of pricing. The price
ceilings imposed by the NGA in the name of consumer protection resulted in
supply shortages, which ultimately proved to be detrimental to consumer in-
terests. 139 With the advent of the NGPA of 1978, the scheme of federal regula-
tion changed to one of gradual deregulation, 140 with market forces determining
133. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944).
134. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); cf Williams, Federal Preemption of State Conservation Laws After
the Natural Gas Policy Act: A Preliminary Look, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 521, 524 (1985) (Suggestion that
the purpose of natural gas regulation during the NGA era was "to transfer wealth from gas producers to
consumers").
135. 372 U.S. at 91.
136. Id. at 94-95.
137. Id. at 92.
138. Id. at 93.
139. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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the price of deregulated gas, and the FERC's duties in terms of pricing were
curtailed significantly.
The aim of the NGPA is similar to that of the NGA: consumer protection.
The NGPA's method of achieving that purpose, deregulation, also reveals the
legislation's additional goal of providing a balanced, competitive market which
will ensure adequate supplies to the consumer.
B. The Conflict Between the Transcontinental Ratable-Take Order and
the NGPA's Regulatory Scheme.
Transcontinental was decided under the NGA as modified by the NGPA of
1978. The Court found that Congress, in enacting the NGPA, intended that
the unnatural price manipulation practiced under the NGA be abandoned; there-
fore, the Mississippi Board's ratable-take order could not be upheld either, since
its effect would be to artificially stimulate demand. 141
The Court also determined that the FERC's oversight function of costs passed
on to the consumer by the interstate pipeline established a pattern of continued
federal occupation of the natural gas pricing field. 112 If the FERC finds the
pipeline's purchasing costs "excessive due to fraud, abuse, or similar grounds," 1,a
the pipeline must answer to the FERC and consequently will not be allowed
to pass those excessive costs on to the consumer. 1 This continued federal in-
volvement refutes any contention that the federal government relinquished all
authority over the high-cost gas market under the NGPA. 14 5
Transco's attempt to transmit purchasing costs of the Harper Sand gas to its
customers had in fact been challenged in a FERC proceeding on grounds of
abuse prior to the decision in Transcontinental. 1 The FERC wanted the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) to order Transco to disregard Mississippi's Rule
48147 and to pursue a less costly purchasing plan regarding the Harper Sand
gas.' 4 The judge refused to instruct Transco to disregard Rule 48, as it was
Mississippi law, and held that the pipeline had to obey the ratable-take order
as long as the order was in force. 14S As a result, the judge held that Transco's
purchases were not imprudent in light of the ratable-take order. 150
The Court considered the grounds of the ALJ's finding in the FERC proceeding
illuminative of a conflict between the Mississippi order and federal regulatory
141. 474 U.S. at 424.
142. Id. at 423 n. 5.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c)(2) (1982).
144. 474 U.S. at 423.
145. Id.
146. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. 33 F.E.R.C. 63,026 (1985).
147. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
148. 33 F.E.R.C. at 65,073.
149. Id. at 65,074.
150. 474 U.S. at 423 n. 5.
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jurisdiction. 5 1 The Court's conclusion was that Mississippi's actions were
preventing the FERC from exercising its oversight function over purchasing
practices. 152 Had the ALJ held that the Mississippi order caused excessive pur-
chasing costs, an inherent conflict between federal and state law would have
been recognized. Under those circumstances preemption would have been
warranted under the supremacy clause. 153 In light of the AL's ruling uphold-
ing the ratable-take order, 5 4 the Court reasoned that preemption was warrant-
ed anyway, since the Mississippi Board's ruling increased prices and thus
subverted Congressional intent. 155
The Court, in deciding that Congress did not intend for the states to occupy
the regulatory position abandoned by the federal government upon deregula-
tion, noted that the NGPA explicitly granted additional regulatory authority to
the states.'5 Ratable-take orders, however, were not mentioned. 57 Several major
oil and gas-producing states have issued similar regulatory orders. 11 Thus, Con-
gress was certainly aware of the existence of such orders, and of the Court's
ruling in Northern Natural, during the development of the NGPA. The allowance
of these ratable-take orders would be counterproductive to the uniformity of
the natural gas market envisioned by Congress. 159
The Transcontinental decision seems to convey that a state can intervene in
the regulatory arena of natural gas as long as its actions further the federal goals
of low prices to the consumer and a market free of most restrictions on compe-
tition. Since the Mississippi order did affect natural gas price and demand, the
Court's reasoning is understandable; however, the ruling leaves the states in
a quandary. Most state regulations could conceivably affect market conditions
in some way, thus infringing on the power attributed to the federal government
by the Transcontinental decision. Yet, the states have a substantial and tradi-
tional interest at stake which bears regulation - the conservation of their natural
resources.
C. The States' Interests
The states' primary concerns in the conservation of oil and gas arise in the
areas of waste prevention and protection of correlative rights. The states' problem
151. Id.
152. Id. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. For a general discussion, compare Williams, Federal Preemption
of State Conservation Laws After the Natural Gas Policy Act: A Preliminary Look, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv.
521, 529-30 (1985) (Suggestion that the fraud and abuse oversight function of the FERC is to be exercised
in a "hands-off" manner).
153. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
154. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 33 F.E.R.C. J 63,026 (1985).
155. 474 U.S. at 423.
156. See supra note 111.
157. See 474 U.S. at 423-24.
158. 372 U.S. 84, 101 n.3 (1963). (Justice Harlan dissenting).
159. 474 U.S. at 423.
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lies in the fact that the unfettered exercise of the principle embodied in the Rule
of Capture'60 can produce two undesirable offspring - waste and drainage. 16'
Waste can result if interest owners overproduce to keep from being drained
themselves, while there is no market for the gas they produce. Surface storage
of excess gas is generally not feasible,16 2 and if the demand for gas is low,
the producer's gas could be drained by other producers in the common source
or pool who are able to market their gas. To combat these obvious inequities,
states modify the Rule of Capture through various measures which further the
doctrine of correlative rights.
The utility of ratable-take orders is apparent when the bargaining positions
of the pipeline purchaser and the producer are examined. Also, the relative
scarcity of pipelines places the gas producer at the mercy of the pipeline pur-
chasers in some respects. Since natural gas by its very nature is economically
transportable only by pipeline, it is important for a gas producer to have a pipeline
nearby before he drills a well at a proposed location. It is even more important
for the producer to be able to sell his gas to the neighboring pipeline once produc-
tion begins. If he does not obtain a contract, he runs the risk of frustrating his
market outlet and of having his own gas drained from beneath him, as was
Coastal's plight in Transcontinental. 163 Ratable-take orders serve to provide a
market outlet for the gas producer by requiring pipeline purchasers to take propor-
tionately from all the interest owners in a common source of supply. Conse-
quently, all owners are able to produce and market their fair share of gas, thus
enjoying their complete property rights. 1  Since Transcontinental forecloses
the use of ratable-take orders by the states, however, the alternatives necessar-
ily lie in the area of production regulation. ' 65
D. States Are Left With the Alternative of Production Regulation
States may protect correlative rights and prevent waste and drainage through
regulation of the production of natural gas. 166 One method of production regu-
lation is prorationing, in which the state oil and gas commission determines
the allowable or maximum amount to be produced from a reservoir during a
certain period of time and allocates this total amount among the wells involved.
States may determine their allowables on the basis of market demand in order
to protect correlative rights. When the market demand is low, allowables may
160. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the marketing conditions in the natural gas industry, see Martin, The Establish-
ment of Allowables for Production of Gas in Louisiana, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 267, 270-71 (1986).
163. Martin, supra note 162, at 270-73.
164. See 1A W. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 103.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1987).
165. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
166. For a general discussion of prorationing, see McDonald, Prorationing of Natural Gas Production:
An Economic Analysis, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 153 (1986).
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be reduced, and accordingly, when market demand is high, the allowables may
be adjusted upwardly. The logic underlying this method is that when gas produc-
tion is in excess of market demand, curtailing production will prevent pipeline
purchasers from discriminating against producers in a common source or supply.
In Mississippi, however, prorationing on the basis of market demand is ex-
pressly prohibited by statute. 167 The method of setting allowables is on the ba-
sis of the pool or reservoir's maximum efficient rate of production, subject to
the enforcement and protection of the correlative rights of the owners of a com-
mon source of oil and gas. 168
Moreover, in an excellent article encompassing the subject, Professor Martin
suggests reasons why the market demand method of determining allowables
is impractical for natural gas. 169 Since the practice in the natural gas industry
is to sell gas via the use of long-term contracts, adjustment of allowables to
meet market demand could interfere with the expectations of the parties in-
volved. 
170
If a take-or-pay clause17' is involved in the long-term contract, the pipeline
purchaser could conceivably be relieved of its obligation thereunder via a force
majeure17 2 defense. 73 This type of prorationing does not seem to be a viable
answer to the correlative rights problem, since the pipeline purchaser is the
only party relieved. The non-contract producer is still not assured that his gas
will be sold even if allowables are reduced, since Transcontinental soundly refut-
ed any possibility that the state could force the pipeline purchaser to take gas
ratably from all producers involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
A state such as Mississippi, in which the natural gas prorationing determina-
tion is not made with reference to market demand, must strive to develop an
equitable method of setting allowables so that the correlative rights of co-owners
in a common source of supply will be protected. In view of the concerns noted,
this will prove to be a difficult task, and may result in much litigation, as deter-
minations will have to be made on an individual basis.
In view of Transcontinental, it is clear that any course of action the several
states may choose to protect correlative rights must necessarily be in the area
167. Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-1-1 (1972).
168. Id.
169. Martin, supra note 162, at 282.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 12.
172. A force majeure is an unforeseen event beyond the parties' control the occurrence of which can
be used as a defense to non-performance of a contract. See generally Annotation, Gas and Oil Lease Force
Majeure Provisions: Construction and Effect, 46 A.L.R. 4th 976 (1986); 4 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS
LAW § 733 (1986).
173. Martin, supra note 162, at 270-71.
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of production regulation. Understanding that Transcontinental stands for the
proposition that a state may not force pipeline purchasers to take ratably among
the owners of a common source of supply, producers of natural gas should pro-
cure contracts with pipeline purchasers whenever possible. This state of affairs
will continue to exist until Mississippi and similarly situated states adopt a via-
ble method of production regulation.
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